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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of remote sensing of the earth by satellite' has grown tre-
mendously since the United States launched the first such satellite, Land-
sat 1, in 1972.2 In 1984, the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization
Act3 began the gradual transfer4 of the United States Landsat program to
the private sector. The Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT)
is the private operator licensed pursuant to the Act5, and is preparing to
launch the first privately-operated remote sensing satellite, Landsat 6, in
1991.6 The Commercialization Act requires operators to make raw data7
1 Remote sensing from space is best defined as "a methodology to assist in characterizing the
nature and condition of the natural resources, natural features and phenomena, and the environment
of the earth by means of observations and measurements from space platforms." PROGRESS REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON REMOTE SENSING OF THE EARTH BY SATELLITES ON THE WORK OF
ITS SECOND SESSION, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/111, at 2 (1973) [hereinafter COPUOS '73].
2 Greenburg, Third Party Access to Data Obtained via Remote Sensing: International Legal
Theory versus Economic and Political Reality, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 361, 362 (1983).
3 15 U.S.C. § 4201-4292 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Commercialization Act]. For a discussion of
the purpose and function of this legislation, see infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
4 Landsat commercialization is to proceed in three phases. Phase 1, which is designed to in-
crease data markets, requires the Secretary of Commerce to contract for private sector marketing of
Landsat data, and private operation of the system. Title to the Landsat satellites is to remain with
the government. Phase 2 is a six-year transition period, during which the Secretary shall "contract
for private development, operation, and ownership" of a non-governmental remote sensing system.
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, LAND REMOTE-SENSING COM-
MERCIALIZATION ACT OF 1984, S. REP. No. 458, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 658, [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The third phase provided
for in the Act is the complete termination of government authority, and thus completion of commer-
cialization on July 17, 1994. See Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4227.
5 See Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at §§ 4241-4246; Licensing of Private Remote-Sens-
ing Space Systems, 15 C.F.R. § 960 (1988).
6 COPUOS, Review of National and International Space Activities for the Calendar Year 1987,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/406/Add.4, at 30 (1988) [hereinafter COPUOS REVIEW]; telephone inter-
view with Richard Mroczynski, EOSAT Director External Affairs, and Kevin Corbley, EOSAT
Media Coordinator, October 5, 1989.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 27-29 for a discussion of the differences between raw and
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available to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis,' but it does not pre-
clude the copyrighting of processed satellite information. Because the
United States recently joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, 9 any copyright protection would function
on an international basis. Many commentators have suggested that intel-
lectual property rights in remote sensing data will sharply reduce the
availability of such data to less-affluent users.10
These concerns, however, stem from a most .superficial analysis of
the effects of remote sensing commercialization. Critics have ignored
measures that actually protect developing country access, including the
safeguards built into the Berne Convention to ensure widespread availa-
bility of copyrighted material, treaties on remote sensing designed to
protect international access, and safeguards built into the Commerciali-
zation Act stemming from the United States' commitment to nondis-
criminatory data access. Critics also fail to recognize the necessity of
intellectual property rights to ensure the survival of a commercial remote
sensing program, and the fact that developing countries, with the help of
the international community, can make significant use of primary data
which is not subject to copyright.
This comment examines the function of international copyright pro-
tection of processed data and shows how such intellectual property rights
are compatible with, and will actually encourage, easy access for all
users.
II. REMOTE SENSING GENERALLY
A. History and Uses
The United States launched the first remote sensing satellite, Land-
sat 1, in 1972.11 It has since launched four additional Landsat satel-
lites,' 2 and many other countries have developed or are developing their
13own remote sensing programs
processed data. Although it is recognized that "data" is a plural noun, "data" will be used in this
article in the collective singular sense.
8 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4271.
9 See the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988) [hereinafter Berne Act]; The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Paris Act, 1971, printed in S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1986).
10 Cf Joyner & Miller, Selling Satellites: The Commercialization of Landsat, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 63 (1985).
11 Greenburg, supra note 2; although Landsat was the first satellite dedicated wholly to remote
sensing, earlier spacecraft, dating back to Sputnik 1, engaged in remote sensing activities, COPUOS
'73, supra note 1.
12 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 658.
13 As of March, 1988 (the date of the most recent available evidence), France, the United States,
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Data from remote sensing are virtually unlimited in their uses and
applications. 14 Satellites assist in observing renewable resources, crop-
yield forecasting, oil and mineral exploration, cartography, environmen-
tal observation, and water and watershed management. 5 All nations can
benefit from these satellites' abilities to monitor environmental condi-
tions and to assist in the efficient management of resources.1 6 Also of
global interest is the fact that remote sensing satellites aid in the predic-
tion, management, and prevention of natural disasters. 7
In the United States and in other developed nations, private firms
make up a significant portion of the data user market." Many of these
are data enhancement firms 19 which purchase unenhanced data from
EOSAT (the private satellite operator), process it, and sell it for profit to
such users as oil and mineral companies20 . Public uses of data in indus-
trial nations are mostly limited to the updating of existing information,
and the monitoring of natural phenomena.21 This is probably due to the
fact that information useful for the development of industry, such as in-
formation about topography, land use, hydrology etc., has already been
gained by industrialized countries through the industrialization process.
Thus, developed nations rely on remote sensing not for an initial picture
of these phenomena, but rather for an indication of any changes affecting
known conditions.
The benefit of remote sensing data to lesser developed countries lies
and the Soviet Union operated remote sensing satellites, while programs were planned in Brazil,
Canada, China, India, Japan, and the European Space Agency. COPUOS: REPORT OF THE SCIEN-
TIFic AND TEHCNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF ITS TwENTY-FIFTH SESSION, U.N. Doc
A/AC.105/409, at 13 (1988) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC SUB-COMMITTEE].
14 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4; JOINT NATIONAL PAPER OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (submitted at Unispace 82), U.N. Doc. A/conf.101/np/37, at 22
(1981) [hereinafter ESA NATIONAL PAPER].
15 See REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH UNITED NATIONS/FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANI-
ZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS/UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE ON THE APPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING
TO WATER RESOURCES, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/414, at 5, 12, 14, 15 [hereinafter FAO].
16 Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.101/10, at 41 (1982) [hereinafter UNISPACE 82].
17 U.N. GOAR SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (10th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/SPC/43/SR.10, at
8 (1988) [hereinafter POLITICAL COMMITTEE]; FAO, supra note 15, at 12; See infra note 25 for an
example of disaster prediction.
18 See Lowndes, Value Added to Remotely Sensed Data, 120-2 Av. WEEK & Spc. TECH. 125
(1984).
19 For a definition of the data enhancement industry, see infra note 104. The term "value-added
industry" is often used in writings about remote sensing data processing instead of the term "data
enhancement industry."
20 EarthSat, for example, is a firm which uses remote sensing data for consulting in oil and gas
exploration, Lowndes, supra note 18.
21 UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 42.
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not in its potential for commercial exploitation, but in its potential for
generalized public applications. Primary data about a given territory has
many uses,2 2 rendering such information crucial for developing coun-
tries. 23 Remote sensing can assist in crop-yield prediction, locust con-
trol, water and air monitoring,2 4 and disaster prediction and
management.25 These uses are much less dependent upon processed data
than are the commercial uses of industrialized nations.26 This difference
is important for considering what effect the copyrightability of certain
data types will have on developing countries.
B. Intellectual Property
An understanding of the application of intellectual property rights
to remote sensing data requires an understanding of the difference be-
tween enhanced and unenhanced data. Unenhanced data, or raw data, is
obtained directly from the satellite,27 and primarily consists of digital
information or photographs. 2 Enhanced data, in contrast, is the result
of human or electronic analysis of the raw data.29
Under the Commercialization Act, the private operator must make
unenhanced data available to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis,30
22 Id. For a discussion of developing country uses, see Ambrosetti, Remote Sensing from Outer
Space: Its Significance and Problems from a Third World Perspective, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW &
POL. 1 (1984).
23 "Remote sensing was an indispensable tool in Africa, where the economies of most countries
were dependent on natural resources." Statement of Mr. Irumba (Uganda) in POLITICAL COMMIT-
TEE, supra note 17.
24 UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 42.
25 See supra note 17. In Madagascar, for example, a system using remote sensing is being devel-
oped to monitor the atmosphere and to quickly communicate information about tropical cyclones to
threatened areas. COPUOS: COORDINATION OF OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEM: PROGRAMMES OF WORK FOR 1989 AND 1990 AND FUTURE YEARS, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/415, at 16 (1988) [hereinafter COPUOS PROGRAMS].
26 See infra notes 182-205 and accompanying text; see also UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 26;
Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6. Although some interpretation is always necessary, the thrust
of this argument is that lesser developed countries can obtain the benefits of remote sensing by
employing simple processing techniques on raw data. Thus, they have little need for elaborately
processed data from industrial firms using expensive equipment and software.
27 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4204(4); G.A. Res. 41/65 Annex, PRINCIPLES RE-
LATING TO REMOTE SENSING OF THE EARTH FROM OUTER SPACE, (Principle I(b)), U.N. Doc. A/
41/751 (1986) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
28 Id.; see also Oosterlinck, Legal Protection of Remote Sensing Data, PROC. 27H COLLOQ. LAW
IN OUTER SPACE 112, 113 (1985).
29 Although the Commercialization Act does not specifically define enhanced data, it states that
unenhanced data "does not include conclusions, manipulations, or calculations derived from such
signals or fim products or combination of the signals or film products with other data or informa-
tion." Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4204(4); See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 27.
30 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4271(a).
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"without preference, bias, or any other special arrangement... which
would favor one buyer or class of buyers over another."'" Copyright
protection is thus unavailable to unenhanced data because the very na-
ture of a copyright is to give exclusive rights to the copyright owner. The
policy of nondiscriminatory access would be undermined by private op-
erators attempting to exact royalties or licensing fees from users of raw
data. Predictably, EOSAT does not attempt to copyright unenhanced
Landsat data. 2
Enhanced data, in contrast, is the product of a value-added industry
(as opposed to a data generation industry).33 Firms in this sector in-
crease the value of raw data by interpreting, analyzing, and electronically
processing the data.34 Copyright protection will preserve the value of the
processor's creative efforts by allowing data enhancement firms and data
purchasers to exercise control over the distribution and use of enhanced
data.35 Although one might question the applicability of copyright law
to this data, the statutory definition of a copyright36 certainly suggests
that in the absence of a congressional mandate to the contrary, data
which has been enhanced through human creativity qualifies for protec-
tion.37 Currently, data enhancement firms are in fact copyrighting their
products.38
The foregoing discussion illustrates the fact that an accurate analy-
sis of intellectual property rights in remote sensing data must distinguish
31 Id. at § 4204(3)(A). With this provision Congress intended to prevent the exclusive availabil-
ity of unenhanced data to the first or highest bidder. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 667.
32 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6. EOSAT relies on trade secret protection for certain
aspects of its Landsat operation. A trade secret is any "... . compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it.. ." Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939). This presumably would
not extend to the data itself.
33 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 668. Due to antitrust laws, if EOSAT wishes to
participate in the data enhancement industry it must establish a separate subsidiary which could not
receive preferential treatment in accordance with nondiscriminatory access. Id. at 670.
34 See supra note 29.
35 See infra notes 95-124 and accompanying text.
36 "Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 102(a) (1977).
37 The United States has expressed the belief that enhanced data is the work product of the
analyzer, and unlike unenhanced data, is considered the analyzer's property. COPUOS, REPORT OF
THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITtEE ON THE WORK OF ITS FIFTEENTH SESSION,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/216, at 8 (1978) [hereinafter COPUOS '78]. Furthermore, Congress's recog-
nition that "the private sector, and in particular the 'value-added' industry, is best suited to develop
land remote-sensing data markets" amounts to tacit approval of the copyrightability of such data.
Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4201(8).
38 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra, note 6.
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between the users of enhanced and unenhanced data. Those users which
primarily or exclusively rely on unenhanced data will face no prejudice
from the copyright protection of enhanced data. Developing countries
which employ remote sensing data for generalized purposes3 9 can make
significant use of unenhanced data40 or can process the data them-
selves.41 It is very unlikely that they will suffer from decreased access to
enhanced data, much of which is tailor-designed for the needs of a single
user.
The limited applicability of copyrights to remote sensing data and
the differing needs of developed and developing nations thus combine to
create inherent deterrents to potential abuses of intellectual property
rights. These deterrents are strengthened by a number of international
agreements which both define and limit the rights and duties of produ-
cers and consumers of remote sensing data.
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AFFECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN REMOTE SENSING DATA
Remote sensing data, global by its very nature, is widely sold on the
international market, both to governments and to private firms.42 To be
effective, copyright protection must, therefore, operate on an interna-
tional basis. Producers of processed data would otherwise have no abil-
ity to enforce their copyright against foreign pirates. The United States'
recent adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works43 will provide significant protection for such
processed data worldwide.
The general protection which international copyright agreements
provide, however, must be understood in light of international agree-
ments relating to space and remote sensing." The interrelationship be-
tween worldwide copyright and outer space agreements will ultimately
define the scope and function of intellectual property rights in these types
of data.
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
39 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 182-205.
41 Id.
42 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
43 See Berne Act, supra note 9.
44 See infra notes 70-94 and accompanying text.
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Works4" is the strictest set of international standards for the protection of
authorship.46 Originally negotiated in 1886, it is also the oldest interna-
tional copyright agreement.47 The United States joined the Berne Con-
vention in 1988.48 Prior to that time, seventy-seven states were parties to
the agreement. 49 Thus, United States firms participating in the remote
sensing value-added industry will enjoy significant protection world-
wide,50 provided that their data is copyrightable under the Berne
Convention.
Like the United States copyright code,51 the Berne Convention
broadly defines its scope, stating that "'literary and artistic works' shall
include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression. .."' The docu-
ment lists examples of protected items, which include various sorts of
writings, photographs, and maps.5a This definition clearly encompasses
processed data, which is within the scientific domain and which can be
expressed as writings54, photographs,55 or maps56.
Crucial to an understanding of the copyrightability of data under
the Berne Convention is the fact that a copyright does not protect an
45 See supra note 9.
46 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, S. Rep.
No. 100-352, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3706,
3707. [hereinafter BERNE HisTORY].
47 Berne Convention, S. EXEC. REP. No. 17, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. at 2 (1988) [hereinafter SEN-
ATE REPORT].
48 See Berne Act, supra note 9. The United States' long absence from the convention was due to
differences between United States policy and Berne standards over registration requirements, and
origin of manufacture; SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 2. Although the moral rights issue (see
supra text accompanying notes 65-66) has also influenced United States non-adherence, the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees concluded that United States law protects these rights in accord-
ance with Berne standards. Id. at 3.
49 BERNE HISTORY, supra note 46, at 3707.
50 United States adherence to Berne provides protection for works of domestic authors in 24
additional countries than existed under the Universal Copyright Convention (6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 133), of which the United States has long been a member. BERNE HISTORY,
supra note 46, at 3707. The Universal Copyright Convention consists of 80 members, and differs
from Berne primarily in its lack of minimum levels of protection. Although the United States still
belongs to this convention, the UCC provides that the terms of the Berne Convention govern states
party to both agreements. It is thus doubtful whether the UCC will have any effect on international
copyright for remote sensing data produced by United States firms. KASTENMEIER, REPORT TO
ACCOMPANY H.R. 4262 [BERNE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION AcT OF 1988], H.R. REP. No.
609, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. at 14, 15 (1988).
51 See supra note 36.
52 Berne Act, supra note 9, Art. 2(l).
53 Id.
54 This would include a written interpretation or explanation of data.
55 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
56 See Joyner & Miller, supra note 10, at 68.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:403(1990)
idea, but rather its expression.57 With remote sensing, unenhanced data
is the raw material to which an interpreter applies an idea and, through
this process expresses a protectable, unique creation. It is thus not really
the data that is being protected, but rather the analyses and the conclu-
sions resulting from the interpreter's experience and creativity. This is
the main difference between raw and processed data. Unenhanced data,
in either digital or photographic form, is a mere representation of the
earth as it exists and can enjoy no protection under the Berne
Convention.58
Another way in which Berne protection extends to remote sensing
data is through the data's relation to software. Many commentators be-
lieve that computer programs, which clearly enjoy protection under the
United States copyright code,59 are also protected by the Berne Conven-
tion.' The differences between software and processed data mainly lie in
the fact that software is the tool used to create the data, thereby render-
ing the data a derivative product of the processing software. If the
software is a creative, protectable form of expression, any derivative of
that creativity clearly should enjoy protection as well. s
Once it is established that the Berne Convention applies to remote
sensing data, the agreement itself operates as it would with any other
57 See Oosterlinck, supra note 28, at 115.
58 Article 2(8) reads: "The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information." Berne Act, supra note
9. Thus, there is no protection for the reporting of an event that anyone could have witnessed were
he in the right place at the right time. By analogy, this paragraph applies to raw data which any
entity with the proper technology could gather for itself.
59 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1989). This provision specifies what activities will not
constitute an infringement of copyright in software. By implication, software thus enjoys copyright
protection unless one of these exceptions applies. The language "adaptations so prepared may be
transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner" clearly shows congressional recogni-
tion of copyright for software.
60 Cf Software Protection under the Berne Convention: Transplanting a New Moral Right into
U.S. Soil, 2 SOFTWARE LAW J. 339, 334 (1988).
61 It might be argued that processed data is the inevitable result of the software, and thus does
not contain any creative elements distinct from those of the software. This argument would con-
clude that protection for processed data is unwarranted because software protection alone ade-
quately protects the author's creativity.
This argument ignores the fact that software protection benefits only the owner of the program, in
this case a data enhancement industry participant. Protection for the data itself, in contrast, would
protect purchasers of processed data by ensuring their exclusive right to utilize, exploit, and dis-
tribute data which they acquire. Protecting only software would be counterproductive because if
processed data immediately passed into the public domain, its value would be less than if it were
copyrightable. There would thus be fewer incentives for firms or individuals to create data enhanc-
ing software in the first place (see infra text accompanying notes 95-124). This is the same rationale
for giving, an author rights in derivative works and translations over and above rights he or she
enjoys in the original work (see Berne Act, supra note 9, at articles 2, 8).
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copyrightable subject matter. The Berne Convention establishes mini-
mum standards which must operate in all member nations.62 These stan-
dards dictate that literary works enjoy protection for the life of the
author plus fifty years. 63 Protection of photographs, which are closely
analogous to remote sensing data, exists for a minimum of twenty-five
years." A significant Berne standard is the protection of moral rights,65
which are the rights of an author to object to any "distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to" a
work.66 This protection is particularly important with remote sensing
data because the minor distortion of such data might cause catastrophic
results. 67
In addition to minimum protection, the Berne Convention grants a
work the same protection in a member state that the state affords its own
nationals.68 Such protection cannot be subject to any formality such as
registration with a government agency.69 The major advantage which
national protection grants producers of remote sensing data is that in-
dustrialized nations, where data markets render the pirating of special-
ized data most likely, can establish direct and substantial protection for
enhanced data. Lesser developed nations can maximize their own access
by declining to take such measures, while the minimum Berne standards
will continue to protect data producers in these areas.
The Berne Convention thus creates a framework by which data pro-
ducers may secure global protection of their product from piracy, distor-
tion, or unauthorized use. Yet remote sensing data is more than a type of
creative expression: it is also a product of outer space activities. A com-
plete picture of intellectual property rights thus requires an examination
of the major international agreements governing the use of outer space.
62 Berne History, supra note 46, at 3707.
63 Berne Act, supra note 9, Art. 7(1).
6 4 Id., at Art. 7(4). This article states that additional protection shall be a matter for legislation
in member countries.
65 Id, at Art. 6b.
66 Id Although the United States does not explicitely recognize moral rights, Congress deter-
mined that existing United States law grants the level of protection necessary for Berne adherence.
BERNE HISToRY, supra note 46, at 3714-15.
67 A hypothetical situation illustrates this point: a data enhancement firm may sell processed
data which, among other things, indicates the presence of ground water in a region where a govern-
ment wishes to place a nuclear waste repository. The company which initially purchases this data
may, due to profit motives, alter the data so as to conceal the presence of the ground water and then
resell the data to the hypothetical government. If the government uses the data to build the planned
waste dump, hazardous contamination of ground water could result.
68 Berne Act, supra note 9, Art. 5.
69 Id., Art 5(2). The issue of formalities was the last major obstacle to United States' adherence
to the Berne Convention. BERNE HIsToRY, supra note 46, at 3716.
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B. International Space Agreements
International agreements on outer space and remote sensing modify
the significant intellectual property protection which the Berne Conven-
tion bestows upon the data enhancement industry. The importance of
these agreements is evident in Congress' desire that the commercializa-
tion of remote sensing proceed in a manner that will fulfill the interna-
tional obligations of the United States.
70
The earliest treaty affecting remote sensing is the Multilateral
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967.71 This agreement constitutes the basic body of
international law declaring outer space to be the province of all human-
ity. 72 It states that the use of space must be for the benefit of all nations
regardless of their level of economic or scientific development, 73 and
should promote international cooperation and understanding.74 Further-
more, the treaty imposes an obligation on nations conducting outer space
activities to inform the Secretary-General of the results of such
activities.75
There is no doubt that this agreement obligates the United States to
guarantee all nations access to unenhanced data which the United States
obtains through remote sensing activities. The agreement, which applies
to all space activities whether they "are carried on by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities,"' 76 binds EOSAT as well. The
Remote Sensing Commercialization Act is sensitive to the terms of this
treaty.77 An overwhelming and recurring theme throughout the act is
the policy of the nondiscriminatory availability of unenhanced data,78
which the drafters considered essential to any remote sensing activity.79
The existence of this agreement provides a limitation on the scope of
intellectual property rights in satellite data by ensuring that unenhanced
data will always remain available for the benefit of the international
70 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4203(C); 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 (1988). Congress has
expressely indicated that commercialization must respect international agreements, treaties, and
conventions, including outer space agreements. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 679.
71 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
72 18 U.S.T., supra note 71, at 2411.
73 18 U.S.T., supra note 71, at 2412.
74 18 U.S.T., supra note 71, at 2413.
75 18 U.S.T., supra note 71, at 2418.
76 18 U.S.T., supra note 71, at 2415.
77 Congress specifically acknowledged the Outer Space Treaty when it considered commerciali-
zation, and indicated a desire to conform to its terms. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 679.
78 See Commercialization Act, supra note 3.




The United Nations addressed remote sensing when it adopted a
resolution entitled Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of Earth from
Outer Space.8 More than ten years of debate preceded the adoption of
this resolution,82 which acknowledges the Outer Space Treaty.8 3 By rec-
ognizing each country's sovereignty over its own wealth and resources,
4
this agreement attempts to prevent an entity from using information
about a sensed state to exploit the state's resources. The principles en-
courage states conducting remote sensing to provide data sharing, oppor-
tunities for participation, and technical assistance to other states.85 They
also require states gaining information about environmental damage or
natural disasters to inform any nation which might be in danger.8 6 Like
the Outer Space Treaty, the Principles apply to non-governmental enti-
80 The major limitation on this "Open Skies" policy relates to data of national security interest.
It was Congress' intent that while respecting our international obligations, a private operator must
adhere to certain national security requirements. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 673, 677;
Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4242(bXl). Presumably, this provision would preclude
nondiscriminatory access to data which would harm the national security of the United States. It is
also worth noting that Congress' Landsat policy has no bearing on spy satellites, even though these
too employ the basic principles of remote sensing. In fact, Congress believes that its "Open Skies"
policy for Landsat data "[blunts] criticism of other activities, such as operation of classified surveil-
lance satellites." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 685.
81 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27. These principles were adopted without a vote, so the issue of
whether the United States or other space states adopted them is irrelevant. Nevertheless, congres-
sional intent to ensure that commercialization will fulfill our international obligations indicates a
general desire to conform to these principles, even though they did not exist at the time of adoption
of the Commercialization Act.
82 The resolution creating the Principles on Remote sensing recalls earlier resolutions in which
the General Assembly called for the formulation of draft principles. The earliest of these is G.A.
Resolution 3234 (XXIX) (1974). One of the main obstacles to drafting principles was the regulation
of dissemination of information to third party states. COPUOS LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.383, at 2 (1983) [hereinafter LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE]. For an analysis of the
issues concerning a state's sovereignty over data about its territory, see infra text accompanying
notes 148-166.
83 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principle III.
84 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principle IV. Several countries argued that sovereignty exists
over information concerning natural resources, thereby requiring a sensing state to obtain consent
before it may sense a foreign state, or disseminate information about that state to other nations; see
LEGAL SUB-COMMITrEE, supra note 82, at 8; LETTER DATED 15 OCTOBER 1974 FROM THE PERMA-
NENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/1047, at 3-4 (1974) [hereinafter ARGENTINA-BRA-
ZIL DRAFT PRINCIPLES]; FRANCE AND USSR: WORKING PAPER (DRAFT PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE FIELD OF REMOTE SENSING OF EARTH RESOURCES BY MEANS
OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.99 (1974) [hereinafter FRANCE AND USSR
PROPOSALS].
85 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principles V-VIII.
86 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principles IX, X.
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ties, and, therefore, to EOSAT. 7
It is apparent that the principles represent a contractarian approach
to remote sensing activities. The few states that possess the technology
and funds necessary to engage in remote sensing are entitled to sense any
territory over which they fly. In exchange for this privilege, the sensing
state must make data available to the sensed state (or any other state), as
well as provide technical assistance to enable states to process the infor-
mation.8" This notion explains why draft principles severely restricting
the rights of sensing states to acquire and disseminate data, such as those
of Argentina and Brazil, 9 were absent in the final resolution. It would
have been unconscionable for a country to demand unrestricted data ac-
cess while simultaneously imposing significant restrictions on sensing
activities.
The U.N.'s remote sensing principles and United States policy con-
flict on one significant issue: nondiscriminatory access to enhanced
data.90 If these principles had the force of a treaty, which they do not,91
intellectual property rights in enhanced data would not be possible. It is
the position of the United States, however, that a strong data enhance-
ment industry is necessary for a commercial remote sensing program to
survive.9g Furthermore, the creation of exceptions to the Berne Conven-
tion for the benefit of developing countries93 will give these countries sig-
nificant access to analyzed data which the convention otherwise protects.
The interrelationship between the Berne Convention and these mul-
tilateral space agreements thus protects the interests of data producers,
data purchasers, and developing nations alike. The Commercialization
Act, in committing EOSAT to observe and fulfill the international obli-
gations of the United States, ensures that these agreements will become a
part of the United State's remote sensing program. Many have suggested
that intellectual property rights under Berne are incompatible with uni-
87 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principle XIV.
88 See supra notes 85-86.
89 See supra note 84.
90 Principle XI states: "As soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning the
territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the sensed state shall have access to them on a nondis-
criminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms. The sensed State shall also have access to the avail-
able analyzed information concerning the territory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any
State participating in remote-sensing activities on the same basis and terms, taking particularly into
account the needs and interests of the developing countries." PRINCIPLES, supra note 27 (emphasis
added).
91 See Bour6ly, Legal Problems Posed by the Commercialization of Data Collected by the Euro-
pean Remote Sensing Satellite ERS-1, 16 J. SPACE LAW 129, 132 (1988).
92 See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
93 See Berne Act, supra note 9, Appendix; and infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
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versal access to information under the space treaties.94 Yet, it is precisely
the compatibility of these allegedly competing interests that will ensure
the continued benefits of remote sensing. Quite simply, without copy-
right protection, the subject of universal access - the data itself - may
well cease to exist.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR THE
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REMOTE SENSING.
A. Commercialization and the Data Enhancement Industry
The United States commercialized Landsat because Congress real-
ized that inefficient government operation was suppressing data mar-
kets.95 Landsat was originally developed as an experimental system, and
despite its success, the government had no long-range plans to fully de-
velop the program in a user-oriented fashion.96 The fact that the public
remote sensing program was not generating enough revenue in data sales
to cover its operation costs 9 7 threatened the existence of the program
itself.98
Congress recognized the fact that commercialization was necessary
to ensure a continued United States remote sensing program,99 and thus,
the continuation of the program's global benefits." °° As a result, The
Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act is an attempt to maintain
the United States' leadership in remote sensing and to ensure data con-
tinuity within the framework of a privately-operated system.10 1 The Act
also strives to stimulate civilian research and development in remote
sensing while minimizing the federal investment required to achieve data
94 See infra notes 146-156 and 167-175, and accompanying text.
95 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 659.
96 The Commercialization of Meterological and Land Remote-Sensing Satellites: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture & the Environment and the Subcomm. on Space
Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at IX
(1983) (Summary of Hearings on Proposed Sale of United States Remote-Sensing Satellites) [herein-
after Commercialization Hearings].
97 Id.; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 659.
98 If the private sector did not take over Landsat, the program was scheduled to die with the
demise of Landsat 5. Commercialization Hearings, supra note 96, at X.
99 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 660.
100 Several countries operate Landsat ground stations which depend on a continuous data flow
from the satellites. See infra note 202. The elimination of Landsat would render these ground sta-
tions inoperable. Furthermore, remote sensing satellites operated by other countries (see supra note
13) would not provide the same measure of benefit because they are technologically inferior to Land-
sat. Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
101 See Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4202(1); Commercialization Hearings, supra
note 96, at XXI-XXIII; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 671.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:403(1990)
continuity."0 2 The Act will accomplish these goals through a phased
timetable for commercialization.1
0 3
A strong data enhancement industry 4 is essential for commerciali-
zation to succeed.'° 5 This is because commercialization will fail without
data markets,"°6 and the data enhancement industry is best suited to de-
velop these markets.'0 7 A healthy data enhancement industry will maxi-
mize marketing potential for EOSAT because this user segment must
purchase its raw data from EOSAT. Yet currently, as a result of previ-
ous government operation,'0 8 the data enhancement industry is the
smallest purchaser of unenhanced data."° It is apparent that because
EOSAT's revenues currently do not cover its operating costs,1 10 this
fledgling market must expand to ensure Landsat's economic survival.
Expansion cannot occur without copyright protection for processed data.
B. Intellectual Property Rights
International copyright protection for enhanced data is necessary to
induce firms to enter the data enhancement industry. Even a small data
enhancement firm must invest significant capital in software, equipment,
and trained personnel before it can begin operation. Copyright laws will
protect this investment' and, by making processed data more valuable,
will provide an incentive for firms to enter the market. Without the eco-
nomic rents created by copyright, it is unlikely that enough firms will
produce sufficient enhanced data to make commercialization worthwhile.
This is because the data enhancement industry will constitute the market
for raw data necessary for EOSAT to realize a profit."
12
In addition to stimulating the data enhancement industry's demand
102 Id.
103 See supra note 4.
104 "[IThe value-added industries are the service companies who, for a fee, will take the data from
the operator(s) of the satellite, ground acquisition, archiving, and processing systems.. .and create
sophisticated, useful information from the data itself beyond the standard film product . .;" Com-
mercialization Hearings, supra note 96, at 573 (Statement of Frederick B. Henderson II).
105 Id. at 570.
106 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 660.
107 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4201(8).
108 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
109 The government is still the largest user, and the international market is the second largest.
Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6. EOSAT does not participate in the data enhancement indus-
try. Id. For an explanation of how the United States government's use of data differs from that of
the international market, see supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
110 Id.
111 Commercialization Hearings, supra note 96, at 584, 585 (Statement of Frederick Henderson,
III).112 See Commercialization Hearings, supra note 96, at 584.
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for unenhanced data, providing copyright protection will increase de-
mand for enhanced data itself. This is because the data enhancement
industry is likely to have more customers when buyers can be certain that
specialized, enhanced data will not be available to their competition. For
example, an oil company is more likely to pay a high price for data show-
ing the location of certain off-shore oil reserves if it knows that other oil
companies, either domestic or foreign, are not privy to the same
information.
The value of enhanced data certainly entitles the data to enjoy at
least the level of protection which the Commercialization Act grants
unenhanced data.113 EOSAT is protected from the competition of a sec-
ondary market in raw data. Developing nations, data enhancement
firms, or any other group of users are barred from exchanging
unenhanced data among themselves. Instead, each user must purchase
data directly from EOSAT. This provision is clearly compatible with the
spirit of nondiscriminatory access. Otherwise, the Commercialization
Act, which stresses nondiscriminatory access, would be internally incon-
sistent. If unenhanced data qualifies for such protection then enhanced
data should qualify as well.
At this point one may wonder whether there is really any difference
between the types of protection afforded raw and processed data respec-
tively. At first glance it appears that EOSAT may control the distribu-
tion of raw data much the same way that a copyright would permit the
data enhancement industry to control the distribution of processed data.
There are crucial differences, however, between these two types of pro-
tection. Initially, the policy of nondiscriminatory access requires
EOSAT to make unenhanced data available to anyone who wants it. A
data enhancement firm, however, may operate exclusively for the benefit
of a single client, and is not required to make its product universally
available. Another difference is that EOSAT must charge all purchasers
of raw data the same low price.1 14 This requirement furthers nondis-
criminatory access by making data universally affordable, and by
preventing the private operator from giving certain users preferential
treatment. In contrast, the market will set the price for enhanced data,
which will vary depending upon the degree of enhancement, as well as
the needs of the individual user. Copyright protection will further inflate
the value of this data because users will pay more for the exclusive user
113 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4273 ("[T]he system operator may require that
unenhanced data cannot be reproduced or disseminated by any foreign or domestic purchaser.")
114 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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rights. Copyright owners may also exact royalties for the use of data,
whereas EOSAT cannot.
A final distinction lies in the fact that the value of enhanced data
differs from that of unenhanced data, and thus requires a different type of
protection. EOSAT may sell unenhanced data, which is general in na-
ture, to a variety of users. This type of data's value lies partly in its
universality and thus requires minimal levels of protection. Enhanced
data, on the other hand, is valuable because of its specialization. A data
enhancement firm will probably produce data for a single user or a single
type of user. Because the data would be less valuable to each user if
others had access to it, a copyright, which is exclusive in nature, is the
appropriate form of protection. 15
It is thus apparent that statutory protection of unenhanced data
functions differently from copyright protection of enhanced data. The
former guarantees Landsat's survival (and thus, continued nondiscrimi-
natory access to Landsat data) by ensuring, in the least restrictive man-
ner possible, that EOSAT will not be undermined by a secondary market
for unenhanced data. The latter guarantees the survival of the data en-
hancement industry, in a very restrictive manner, by creating an incen-
tive for players to enter the market.116 This too guarantees the survival
of Landsat and thus continued nondiscriminatory access.117 A signifi-
cant fact is that EOSAT's statutory protection can only operate domesti-
cally. Copyright protection for enhanced data, however, would give data
enhancement firms global protection through the Berne Convention.
Such protection is important in light of the existence of foreign remote
sensing systems, and the competition which they provide.
C. Foreign Competition
Competition from foreign remote sensing systems provides another
reason why legal protection of enhanced data is necessary. Many coun-
tries operate commercial remote sensing systems, 118 and some of these,
such as the French SPOT system and the European Space Agency's
ERS-1 (both commercialized systems), compete with Landsat for inter-
national as well as domestic data markets.119 Aware of this fact, Con-
gress expressed the desire that private sector marketing should operate so
115 For an explanation of how the Berne Convention would protect the value-added industry, see
infra text accompanying notes 126-134.
116 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 13.
119 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 671; see also Bour61y, supra note 91.
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as to successfully compete with these systems. 120 A significant feature of
international intellectual property rights is that these rights will not just
benefit United States data producers, but shall protect competition
among all entities producing enhanced data worldwide. Without copy-
right protection, an individual or entity could pirate enhanced data pro-
duced by someone else and legitimately pass it off as its own. There
would be no mechanism to prevent such an entity from distorting the
data to obtain financial or political benefits (imagine a terrorist group
posing as data merchants). EOSAT currently enjoys protection from pi-
rating,121 and the data enhancement industry should receive such protec-
tion as well. 12
2
The necessity of this protection becomes even clearer when one con-
siders that the United States is the world's leader in remote sensing tech-
nology.123 If Landsat's primary data is superior to that of other systems,
it is likely that the resulting enhanced data is superior as well. This fact
creates a particularly strong incentive for pirates to steal enhanced Land-
sat data. Firms which process data from other remote sensing satellites
could use this information to improve their own images, and thereby un-
fairly compete in the international data market.
Therefore, the nature of a commercial remote sensing program man-
dates copyright protection for enhanced data. The restrictions that copy-
rights would impose are insignificant compared to the benefits of private
Landsat operation, 2 4 which include the continued existence of remote
sensing itself. Such copyright protection will benefit producers of en-
hanced data worldwide due to the existence of multilateral copyright
agreements.
120 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 671.
121 See supra note 113. EOSAT believes that pirating through unauthorized interception of satel-
lite signals may have occurred in the past. Landsat 6 will use a different type of signal, which should
make this possibility less likely. Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
122 The proliferation of international piracy is among the United States' concerns in joining the
Berne Convention. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 16 (statement of Eugene McCallister).
Currently, United States companies lose an estimated $25 billion a year to pirating of intellectual
property. Recent enforcement efforts, however, have begun driving some pirates out of business.
Chicago Tribune, November 12, 1989, § 7 at 1, col. 1, and 10 col. 1.
123 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6. The French SPOT system comes closest to Landsat
technologically, yet that system operates with only three color bands whereas Landsat uses seven.
Id. Other systems, such as those of Japan, India, and the Soviet Union, do not constitute the same
degree of competition because they are short-term in nature, and do not operate on the same global
scale as Landsat. Id.
124 Cf LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 659; Commercialization Hearings, supra note 96,
at VIII, XXII-XXIIl.
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V. REMOTE SENSING UNDER THE BERNE CONVENTION
The Berne Convention will provide the protection necessary to meet
the needs of a commercial remote sensing industry. This agreement con-
sists of two principle components. The first is the main body of the
agreement which details and defines the functions and operation of inter-
national copyright protection for protected works.'25 Although remote
sensing data differs from traditional forms of copyrightable material,
these provisions will operate in much the same way as they otherwise
would. The second component of the Berne Convention is the appendix,
which provides special mechanisms for developing nations to gain access
to copyrighted material. This section is especially relevant to remote
sensing data which may significantly benefit developing countries.
A. The Function of International Copyright in Enhanced Data
The standards of the Berne Convention shall meet the needs of the
data enhancement industry, industrial nations, and developing countries
alike. These are minimum standards which operate in all member na-
tions. 126 A given country may grant more protection for remote sensing
data than that which is discussed here.
127
The data enhancement industry will benefit from some aspects of
the Berne Convention more than other aspects. For example, the mini-
mum periods of protection which Article 7 grants128 are of little benefit
because it is likely that the usefulness of most forms of analyzed data
expires within a short period of time. The requirement in Article 5, how-
ever, that an author receive the same protection in a given country that
such country gives its own nationals, 129 is very relevant to the enhanced
data industry. This provision ensures that a given nation cannot use
copyrights to discriminate in favor of its own data enhancement industry,
or those of certain preferred nations.
Three provisions of the convention will provide the data enhance-
ment industry with adequate control over the distribution and modifica-
tion of enhanced data. These provisions are Article 8 which gives an
author the right to authorize translations, Article 9 which creates a right
to authorize reproductions, and Article 12 which gives an author the
right to authorize adaptations and alterations13 of a work. With the
125 See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
127 See Berne Act, supra note 9, at Art. 5.
128 Berne Act, supra note 9; see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.




right to license and control adaptations, data producers will be able to
maintain the accuracy and integrity of the original product as embodied
in the derivative.131
In addition to empowering data producers with control over unau-
thorized adaptations, the Berne Convention will also enable the data en-
hancement industry to prevent and prosecute piracy. The agreement
gives an author the right to authorize broadcasts of a work while provid-
ing that such authorization does not constitute permission for the inter-
ception and recording of such a broadcast.'32 This measure protects
from interception and theft the transmission of enhanced data by meth-
ods such as satellite broadcasting. Article 15 of the Convention, which
provides that a person whose name appears on the work is the presumed
author, 133 grants data producers a simple method of identifying their
data. Electronic coding, which will elude the detection of pirates, might
be employed on data products as a method of identification. Should the
data producer discover any such infringing material, Article 16 grants
him the right of seizure.'3 4
The Berne Convention thus provides the data enhancement industry
and the international community with a wide spectrum of protection.
The minimum periods of protection, the right to oversee adaptation, and
the mechanisms to deter and prosecute piracy will protect a data en-
hancement firm's investment, and thereby increase the incentive for firms
to enter the market. The provisions concerning adaptation and piracy
also protect purchasers of enhanced data and the international commu-
nity in general by guaranteeing data accuracy. In some situations, how-
ever, copyright protection may prevent developing nations from
obtaining necessary information. To guard against this possibility, the
Berne Convention contains special provisions for these countries.
B. Developing Countries
While the major provisions of the Berne Convention protect the in-
terests of the data enhancement industry, the Appendix to the Berne
Convention makes enhanced data more accessible to developing na-
131 An example of how this provision would operate would exist if a firm produced a detailed
map of a geologic fault containing certain mineral deposits. The purchasing government, later wish-
ing to build a nuclear reactor, might need to alter this map so that it could determine the least active
regions of the fault. The original data producer would then have the right to oversee the adaptation,
and could thus ensure that its original conclusions are properly interpreted and that the new adapta-
tion reflects accurate information.
132 Berne Act, supra note 9, at Art. 11
I b .
133 Id., at Art. 15(1).
134 Id., at Art. 16.
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tions.135 The justification for this special treatment is that developing
countries due to their economic situation, or social and cultural needs,
may not be "in a position to make provision for the protection of all the
rights as provided for" in the Berne Convention. 136 Such countries may
nevertheless have a significant need for certain copyrighted materials.
Thus, the agreement allows a developing nation which does not have ac-
cess to a scientific work within three years to grant a license for the re-
production of that work.137 The applicant need only establish that it
requested authorization from the copyright owner and was denied, or
that after due diligence the applicant was unable to locate the owner.
138
It may first appear that the benefits of this provision are dubious
with regard to remote sensing data. Three years is a long time to wait for
information that may become obsolete within a much shorter time. Fur-
thermore, a licensee under this provision may only use copies of a work
in connection with "systematic instructional activities,' 139 a restriction
which probably limits data use to classroom situations. In reality, how-
ever, the nature of developing country uses of remote sensing data 40
minimizes any negative effects of these restrictions. These countries need
data to provide an initial portrait of their geology and resources14t -
conditions which are unlikely to change significantly after three years.
The use of this information for instructional activities will create trained
experts who may then use their own knowledge to solve problems and
exploit resources which the data reveals. 42 Finally, entities which pos-
sess crucial and timely information about such phenomena as natural
disasters must, under the Remote Sensing Principles, make such infor-
mation immediately available to the affected states. 43
The Appendix to the Berne Convention is also significant because it
demonstrates that the international community is sensitive to the needs
of developing nations in obtaining copyrighted material. The unique na-
ture of remote sensing data suggests that this sensitivity will likely result
in easier access to copyrighted data that is especially relevant to a given
135 Berne Act, supra note 9, Appendix. For a discussion of measures in multilateral copyright
agreements designed to aid developing nations, see Tocups, The Development of Special Provisions of
International Copyright Law for the Benefit of Developing Countries, 29 J. CoPYRiGHT Soc'y. U.S.A.
402 (1982).
136 Berne Act, supra note 9, Appendix, at Art. I(1).
137 Berne Act, supra note 9, Appendix, at Art. III.
138 Id., Appendix, at Art. IV.
139 Id., Appendix, at Art. III(3)(2)(a)(ii).
140 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
141 Id.
142 See infra notes 182-201 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 25, 86.
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country's needs. The Principles on Remote Sensing," coupled with the
United States' dedication to nondiscriminatory data access, 145 thus en-
sure that developing nations will have easy access to useful data. Finally,
it is unlikely that a developing nation will face a crucial need for pro-
tected, enhanced data that cannot be equally satisfied with unprotected,
unenhanced data.1" In the event that this situation should occur, the
Appendix to the Berne Convention creates a useful safety net.
It thus becomes clear that the benefits of copyright protection for
enhanced data outweigh any disadvantages. These benefits must be kept
in mind when one considers the specific criticisms and concerns which
commentators have raised concerning commercialization and copyright
protection.
VI. CRITIcs' VIEWS AND AUTHOR's RESPONSES
Criticisms of intellectual property rights in remote sensing data fall
into two main categories. The first begins with the premise that commer-
cialization and "Open Skies" 47 in general violate a country's sovereignty
over its resources and the information about those resources. Allowing
the data enhancement industry to copyright its product would exacerbate
this problem by denying sensed states access to certain types of informa-
tion about their territories. This in turn would allow entities with exclu-
sive information about a state to economically exploit the state.
The second criticism is that copyrightability would create a scarcity
of remote sensing data, particularly unenhanced data which would be
unprofitable to produce. This situation, like the first, would deprive a
sensed state of information about its own resources, again subjecting the
state to economic exploitation.
Neither of these situations is a realistic possibility. The authors of
these criticisms base their fears on a misunderstanding of United States
policy, a lack of faith in international space agreements, the assumption
that only processed data is useful, and an ignorance as to the actual level
of cooperation between private operators, the international community,
and developing countries.
A. Sovereignty and Data Dissemination
The issue of how the gathering of information by remote sensing
affects a state's sovereign rights was a major obstacle to the adoption of
144 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32, and infra text accompanying notes 176-178.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 182-186.
147 See infra note 149.
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principles governing the use of remote sensing. 14' The United States,
which advocated its "Open Skies" policy of non-restricted sensing and
data dissemination, 49 was at odds with other states which felt that a
nation's sovereign rights extended to information about its resources. 50
This view would have required the sensing state to obtain consent from
the sensed state before acquiring satellite information, or transferring it
to third parties.1"' A strict view on sovereignty would clearly proscribe
proprietary rights over processed data. If the information which a satel-
lite obtains is the property, by right of sovereignty, of the sensed state,
then clearly no private entity could copyright data, whether enhanced or
unenhanced.152
Economic exploitation is the major evil which critics foresee as the
result of this alleged violation of sovereignty. The argument is that a
sensing state could gain valuable economic information about a country,
which might include information about crops, communications, etc.
15 3
Commercial enterprises, armed with this data, may then attempt to gain
control of that country's resources.' 54 Copyright protection, by making
this data the exclusive property of the owner of the data, would aid large
international companies which desire to use the information to guide
their investment in the economies and resources of developing nations."55
Industrial monopolies could then determine the direction of economic
development in developing countries156 while siphoning profits from de-
veloping nations into corporate bank accounts. The perceived notion
that developing nations are incapable of analyzing unenhanced data
themselves increases the advantage that industrial entities would enjoy
over developing countries, and would place industrial entities in a vastly
superior bargaining position. 57
148 LEGAL SUB-COMMITrEE, supra note 82.
149 United States: Working Paper, COPUOS Legal Sub-committee (Agenda item 4), U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.103 (1975). This view, which holds that only a policy of global and nondiscrimi-
natory data sharing can guarantee remote sensing's maximum benefits, assumes that no sovereign
rights extend into outer space, thus entitling the sensing state to take pictures of any nation from
space-based platforms.
150 See supra, note 84.
151 Id.
152 The United Nations Principles on Remote Sensing, which do not recognize sovereignty over
information about resources, nevertheless state that enhanced data should be freely available to the
sensed state. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
153 See LEGAL SUB-COMMrrrEE, supra note 82, at 8 (statement of Mexico delegate).
154 Id.
155 Greenburg, supra note 2, at 379.
156 Id.
157 Id., citing Ambrosetti, The Relevance of Remote Sensing to Third- World Economic Develop-
men=" Some Legal and Political Aspects, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 569, 578-79 (1980).
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These concerns of economic exploitation due to a loss of sovereignty
are unfounded. The Outer Space Treaty"'8 and the Principles on Remote
Sensing 59 apply to EOSAT as strongly as they apply to the govern-
ment.1 60 These agreements recognize a state's sovereignty over its wealth
and resources,1 61 and obligate sensing states to cooperate with and to
share information with the international community.1 62 Unenhanced
data, which is available to all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis, can
be extremely valuable to developing nations due to the high level of inter-
national cooperation devoted to training experts from developing coun-
tries in data interpretation and modes of analysis.1 63 In fact, in the hands
of a local expert, unenhanced data about a given territory may be more
valuable than enhanced data about the same territory in the hands of a
foreign commercial enterprise.64 This fact will actually give the devel-
oping nation more bargaining power than the industrial monopoly.
1 65
Economic exploitation is also unlikely because dopyright, which is
exclusive in nature, will allow producers of processed data to restrict the
data's availability to legitimate commercial enterprises. Such organiza-
tions are much more likely than pirates, which are often gangs of organ-
ized criminals,1 66 to observe and conform to international legal principles
designed to protect the developing countries. Without copyright, pirates
or other underworld characters could legally obtain processed data, and
would likely use it to the detriment of developing nations. Copyright not
only creates a mechanism whereby data producers can withhold data
from such individuals, but it also allows firms to detect and prosecute
any offenders.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that it is highly unlikely that
copyright protection for enhanced data will lead to the exploitation of
developing countries' resources through the violation of state sover-
eignty. Pictures of a given territory are subject to universal notions of
state sovereignty, and will not create a license for any state or entity to
158 See supra note 71.
159 See supra note 27.
160 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 71, at Art VI; and PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principle
14.
161 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principle IV.
162 PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at Principles V, IX; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 71, at Art. I,
X.
163 See infra notes 182-205 and accompanying text.
164 See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
165 It is suggested that developing countries will abandon their steadfast adherence to antiquated
notions of sovereignty and come to realize that policies favoring more liberal dissemination of re-
mote sensing data are in their best interest. Ambrosetti, supra note 22, at 30-31.
166 Chicago Tribune, supra note 122, at 10 col. 1.
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violate these notions. Such possibilities are so remote as to be irrelevant
in light of the clear advantages of copyright protection. This same bal-
ancing approach is useful in considering whether copyright will reduce
overall data availability.
B. Availability of Enhanced and Unenhanced Data
The second major criticism of copyright protection for remote sens-
ing data is that such a scheme would reduce the availability of data to
sensed states. At its most extreme, this view holds that protection of
enhanced data will create a scarcity of all forms of data, enhanced and
unenhanced, for developing as well as industrial nations67
This view begins with the assumption that commercialization of re-
mote sensing per se results in a reduction of data availability.
168
Although critics recognize the United States "Open Skies" policy of non-
discriminatory access to raw data,169 they foresee the legal protection of
enhanced data resulting in its exclusive ownership by the highest bid-
der.17° This situation will motivate a commercialized remote sensing in-
dustry, seeking to maximize profits, to put significant emphasis on the
marketing and availability of enhanced data to the detriment of
unenhanced data. 7 1 The increase in the price of raw data resulting from
its decreased availability would supposedly drive developing nations out
of the data market altogether, ultimately harming the remote sensing in-
dustry which could no longer rely on this market segment. 172
This argument further states that a private operator of remote sens-
ing satellites could participate in the data enhancement industry, and
deny competitors access to unenhanced data.173 This data monopoliza-
tion would certainly destroy any efficiency created by commercializa-
tion 74 and would further reduce the availability of all forms of data to all
users, including industrialized nations. The ultimate result of a de-
creased availability of data to developing countries could be retaliation
by such measures as the termination of agreements enabling the United
167 See Joyner & Miller, supra note 10.
168 See POLITICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at 8 for the view that commercialization has
increased the cost of remote sensing data.
169 Joyner & Miller, supra note 10, at 74.
170 Id. at 76.
171 Id., citing Commercialization Hearings, supra note 96, at 554-557 (testimony of Peter S.
Thatcher, World Resources Institute.)
172 Joyner & Miller, supra note 10, at 79 citing Yanchinski, Thorny Questions Over Remote Sens-
ing, 86 NEW SCIENTIST 150 (1980).




States to use foreign ground stations for meteorological satellites.175
These fears of data monopolization and scarcity ignore the force of
the United States' dedication to nondiscriminatory access.176 The Re-
mote Sensing Commercialization Act requires EOSAT to make
unenhanced data available on a nondiscriminatory basis at affordable
prices.177 Not only does this policy prevent EOSAT from reducing the
availability of raw data so that it may concentrate on the data enhance-
ment market, but it also prevents EOSAT from monopolizing raw data
for the use of its own data enhancement division.1
78
The argument that a private operator will wish to monopolize raw
data fails on other grounds as well. It is highly improbable that a single
large firm could fully and efficiently develop all conceivable data mar-
kets. Specialized data enhancement firms would thus arise in response to
the demand which the monopolist is unable to satisfy. These firms would
simply purchase their data from foreign operators such as SPOT, thus
creating competition for the supply of both raw and processed data.
Such a scenario would undermine the monopolist's strategy and could
conceivably drive such an operator out of the market. This prospect ren-
ders unlikely the possibility of a firm such as EOSAT attempting to
hoard data. Finally, EOSAT does not even participate in the data en-
hancement industry. 179 Contrary to Joyner and Miller's assumption,
EOSAT's marketing strategy is to profit by increasing the market for
unenhanced data, and to this end sponsors programs to educate foreign
users on potential applications of remote sensing data.' 80
Economic factors indicate that copyright protection for the data en-
hancement industry is essential for this strategy to work, and will actu-
175 Id. at 83, citing G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 551-59 (1981).
176 In 1988, four years after commercialization, Landsat data was continually available world-
wide on a nondiscriminatory basis, COPUOS REVIEW, supra note 6, and remains available today.
Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6. The European Space Agency also favors a policy of nondis-
criminatory access to data produced by ERS-1. ESA NATIONAL PAPER, supra note 14.
177 Most importantly, in direct contradiction to Joyner and Miller's concerns, the legislative his-
tory states "the Committee does not find acceptable .. .the sale of a single copy of an original scene
[unenhanced data] to the highest bidder. Such an action would transfer the proprietary control of
the data from the operator to the purchaser and would be in direct conflict with the principle of
nondiscriminatory access to data, under equal terms and conditions, by all potential purchasers."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 685-6.
178 Congress specifically addressed this possibility in drafting the Commercialization Act, and
thus requires any private operator wishing to enter the data enhancement industry to establish a
separate subsidiary which may not receive preferential treatment. LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra
note 4, at 670.
179 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
180 Id. EOSAT's marketing force is also attempting to stimulate the growth of the data enhance-
ment industry, which would increase the market for raw data.
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ally increase the availability of data. Protection of enhanced data will
create an incentive for firms to enter the data enhancement industry,
which will increase the overall market for raw data. This increase in
demand will drive down the price of raw data to all users. This is espe-
cially the case because Landsat data is analogous to a public good,18 1 for
which the fixed costs of the satellite operation constitute the bulk of an
operator's expenses. When demand increases, the marginal cost of sup-
plying additional users is very low. This fact will enable the operator to
cover its operating costs by spreading them over a broader range of users
while charging a lower price per individual user.
The major criticisms of intellectual property protection for en-
hanced data fail to consider the many mechanisms designed to protect
the interests of developing countries, and the benefits that copyright will
confer upon all users of remote sensing data. These skeptics make the
basic assumption that developing nations, unable to fend for themselves,
require constant protection from commercial exploitation. Paternalism,
however, will only perpetuate the dependence of developing countries on
industrial nations. The best way to increase the developing countries'
access to processed data is, therefore, to teach developing nations how to
process data themselves. Aware of this fact, the international commu-
nity has already mobilized to train developing nations how to interpret
unenhanced data in order to obtain its maximum potential.
C. The Benefits of Unenhanced Data and International Cooperation.
Critics incorrectly assume that only enhanced data are useful to de-
veloping nations. Unenhanced data, including photographs and even
digital information, can be very useful,18 2 because expensive equipment
and advanced technology is not necessary for its interpretation.18 3 De-
veloping nations can accomplish significant results with trained local ex-
perts,18 4 who in many cases will produce analyses superior to those the
data enhancement industry with computers' and experts unfamiliar
181 A public good is a product or service such that "one person's use of public good[s]... does not
prevent simultaneous use by others." Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. LAw
& ECON. 293 (1970).
182 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
183 See UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 26.
184 An expert interpreting raw data should understand "(a) the principles of the interaction of
electromagnetic (EM) radiation with matter; (b) the process of the propagation of the radiation
through the atmosphere; (c) the processes involved in detecting radiation with various types of detec-
tors; and (d) the characteristics of image formation and display for both analog and digital represen-
tations. FAO, supra note 15, at 5.
185 "Visual image analysis by an experienced photo-interpreter who is a specialist in a given field
is generally superior to automatic image analysis in instances where the thrust of the interpretation
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with local conditions could produce.'1 6
The training of experts in developing countries is, of course, essen-
tial for developing nations to make effective use of remote sensing
data.187 Congress, aware of this fact, specifically encouraged federal
agencies to provide these countries with remote sensing "data, technol-
ogy, and training."' 8  In addition, the international community con-
ducts a plethora of ongoing programs to train users in the areas of
remote sensing applications and technology.'89 A few applications which
training courses specifically address include matters of geological sci-
ence,' ° crop planning,191 and water management. 192 The United Na-
tions system also conducts studies to discover new uses and applications
of remote sensing for the benefit of the international community. 19
3
Technological training is necessary for local experts to understand
the fundamentals of data interpretation. 194 To this end, programs are
planned'9" which include training in the use of computers for data en-
hancement, 196 teaching methods of spectral field measurements, 197 and
developing techniques in image analysis. 9 8 Developed countries, as well
as developing countries with abilities in data interpretation, have organ-
ized programs to assist other developing nations in the acquisition of re-
mote sensing knowledge. 199 Many nations have even set up fellowships
effort lies in the recognition and complex evaluation of geometric-structural features and patterns."
UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 40. In other words, experts from developing countries trained in
photo-interpretation can perform a superior analysis on raw data in many instances than could a
computer.
186 Experts from similar socio-economic and physical environments are also best suited for train-
ing experts from developing countries in the interpretation of remote sensing data. Their experience
allows them to make more useful recommendations than could foreign experts. UNISPACE 82, supra
note 16, at 90.
187 COPUOS '78, supra note 37, at 13; COPUOS LEGAL SUBCOMMrFrEE, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/C2/SR.382 (1983).
188 Commercialization Act, supra note 3, at § 4277(bX2).
189 For a general listing of planned training programs, see COPUOS, CO-ORDINATION OF OUTER
SPACE AcTIvmEs WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: PROGRAMMES OF WORK FOR 1989
AND 1990 AND FUTURE YEARS, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/415, at 10-21 (1988).
190 COPUOS, Report of the United Nations International Training Course on Remote Sensing
Applications to the Geological Sciences, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/393 (1987) [hereinafter GEOLOGI-
CAL TRAINING].
191 See supra note 189.
192 Jd.
193 Id at 16-19.
194 See supra note 184.
195 See COPUOS, supra note 189, and GEOLOGICAL TRAINING, supra note 190.
196 Geological Training, supra note 190, at 7.
197 Id
198 SCIENTIFIC SUB-COMMITEE, supra note 13, at 10.
199 Id at 13.
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for the purpose of training experts in developing countries in the use and
analysis of unenhanced data.2 o These trained local experts can take ad-
vantage of the improving technology of low-cost microcomputers for the
analysis of digital and photographic information.2 "1 Technology and in-
ternational cooperation are thus creating limitless possibilities for devel-
oping countries' use of unenhanced data.
Developing nations must have rapid access to unenhanced data to
achieve the data's maximum beneficial use. This goal requires users to
build expensive ground stations for the direct reception of Landsat
data.2 "2 The $6 million investment required20 3 for a ground station may
appear prohibitive for most developing nations. However, experience has
shown that countries in geographical proximity to each other may share
expenses for such worthwhile equipment. 2" Nations can also work to-
gether to process and interpret data.205
The current level of international cooperation to bring about profi-
ciency in developing countries in data processing represents a workable
solution to the problem of developing countries' access to remote sensing
data. Critics' assertions that commercialization and copyright protection
will deny developing nations access to remote sensing data is a theoreti-
cal conclusion which fails to consider the manner in which countries ac-
tually behave. Even if copyright protection does restrict data access, it
will only encourage developing nations to acquire the skills necessary to
process data. This may even allow these countries to eventually compete
in the international market for processed data.
VII. CONCLUSION
The unlimited applications of remote sensing make it an extremely
valuable tool with the potential of solving many of the problems which
face humankind as it enters the twenty-first century. In the United
States, Congress realized that this potential could not be reached with a
governmentally owned and operated remote sensing program. Commer-
cialization was thus necessary for the further development of this
technology.
200 COPUOS, supra note 189, at 13-15.
201 Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6; UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 26.
202 In 1988 ground stations existed in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European
Space Agency, India, Japan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand. COPUOS RE-
vIEw, supra note 6, at 30. The number of ground stations could grow to twenty-five within the near
future. Mroczynski & Corbley, supra note 6.
203 Mroczynski & Corbiey, supra, note 6.
204 UNISPACE 82, supra note 16, at 88.
205 Id. at 89.
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Now that a commercial remote sensing program is operational, the
continued existence of the technology depends upon how well the private
sector can market satellite data. For this purpose, intellectual property
rights in enhanced data are necessary to increase the number of data
enhancement firms and thereby increase the market for raw data.
Although representatives from developing nations have expressed
concern regarding the legal protection ef processed data,2 "6 it is conceiv-
able that in the near future their views will change. This will occur upon
the realization that the benefits of copyright (widespread availability and
low prices for unenhanced data) will outweigh the disadvantages (de-
creased availability of processed data). As developing nations become
capable of processing data themselves, they may also accept copyright
due to the fact that it will protect their own processed data from theft
and misappropriation by entities which might use the information to ex-
ploit the developing nations' resources. These considerations, combined
with the protection of international space agreements, clearly demon-
strate that copyright protection of enhanced remote sensing data will
serve the divergent needs of both industrialized and developing nations.
J. Richard West
206 Cf supra note 153.

